G.R. No. 116155 December 17, 1998
FRANCISCO, JR., DOMINADOR, LEONILA, LEOPOLDO, MERLA, BERNARDINO, CONCHITA, REX and RAMONITO, all surnamed GULANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENCIA Vda. de GULANG, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Florencia Vda. de Gulang, widow of Francisco Gulang, filed an action for judicial partition against her nine children (petitioners) concerning two parcels of land forming part of Francisco’s estate. The properties were the Budbud lot, registered under “Francisco Gulang married to Florencia Gulang,” and the Licanan lot, registered solely in Francisco’s name. After Francisco’s death, the heirs executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waiver of rights, wherein Florencia waived her rights to the Budbud lot in favor of the children, and the children waived their rights to the Licanan lot in favor of Florencia. Titles were subsequently issued accordingly. Florencia later sought to annul this settlement, claiming it was premised on the erroneous assumption that the properties belonged entirely to Francisco’s estate, ignoring her conjugal share.
The Regional Trial Court declared the extrajudicial settlement void, ruling that the properties were conjugal. It held that one-half of each property belonged to Florencia as her conjugal share, and only the remaining halves constituted Francisco’s estate to be partitioned among all heirs. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the new titles and the re-issuance of the original ones, followed by proper partition. Petitioners appealed, but the trial court granted Florencia’s motion for execution pending appeal, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order allowing execution pending appeal of the decision declaring the extrajudicial settlement void and ordering the partition of the estate.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is anchored on the validity of the trial court’s finding that the properties were conjugal. Since the Budbud lot was acquired during the marriage and registered under both spouses, it was presumed conjugal. The Licanan lot, though registered solely in Francisco’s name, was also presumed conjugal as it was acquired during the marriage, absent proof it was acquired by lucrative title or with exclusive funds. Consequently, upon Francisco’s death, only his one-half conjugal share in each property formed part of his estate. The extrajudicial settlement was void because it partitioned the entire properties, effectively disposing of Florencia’s one-half conjugal share without her valid consent—her waiver being premised on a mistake of fact regarding the nature of the properties. Given the clear legal error invalidating the settlement, the trial court’s decision on the merits was likely to be upheld on appeal. The Supreme Court found that the “good reasons” required for execution pending appeal under Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court were present, primarily the advanced age of Florencia, which constituted a compelling circumstance to allow immediate execution to prevent further delay in enjoying her rightful share. The appellate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the special order.