GR 154117; (October, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 154117; October 2, 2009
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR., Petitioner, vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, et al., Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Ernesto Francisco, Jr. filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman against numerous respondents, including former President Joseph Estrada, alleging violations of the Plunder Law and various sections of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). The complaint centered on the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway (MCTE) project. Petitioner alleged that the project, initiated under prior administrations, was manipulated during Estrada’s term to grant undue benefits to private entities, particularly those associated with the Velarde family (AMVEL Land Corporation), through irregular right-of-way acquisitions, contract modifications, and approvals, resulting in grossly disadvantageous terms for the government.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence, finding no probable cause to indict the respondents. The Ombudsman concluded that the acts complained of, such as the approval of the Toll Operations Agreement and subsequent amendments, were undertaken in the regular performance of official duties and within the respondents’ discretionary authority. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court can review and reverse the Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause in dismissing the criminal complaint.
RULING
No. The petition is dismissed. The Court’s power of judicial review over the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial functions is limited. As a rule, the Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional mandate, which includes the discretion to determine whether probable cause exists. This discretion is generally respected unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The legal logic is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the Ombudsman’s constitutionally guaranteed independence. The Court emphasized that a finding of probable cause is an executive function. For the Court to overturn such a finding, the petitioner must demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner, which was not established in this case. The Ombudsman’s resolution was based on its evaluation of the evidence, and mere disagreement with this evaluation is insufficient to warrant judicial intervention. The petitioner failed to prove that the dismissal was arrived at arbitrarily or without factual basis. Consequently, absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, the Court upheld the Ombudsman’s dismissal order.