A.C. No. 8866, September 15, 2020
Catherine V. Villarente, Complainant, vs. Atty. Benigno C. Villarente, Jr., Respondent.

(Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen)

FACTS

This is a disbarment case where the majority found respondent Atty. Benigno C. Villarente, Jr. guilty of gross immorality and ordered his disbarment. The complaint was based on his continued cohabitation with a woman not his wife and siring two children with her. The ponencia held that such conduct constituted a willful, flagrant, and shameless act showing moral indifference to the opinion of the community, thereby violating the lawyer’s duty to behave in a manner consistent with the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Justice Leonen, in his dissenting opinion, frames the factual backdrop by emphasizing the private nature of the allegations. He notes that the issues pertain to the respondent’s personal and intimate relationships. The dissent underscores that the record does not establish circumstances akin to other cases where disbarment for immorality was warranted, such as causing extraordinary harm to an existing legitimate family, exhibiting callous disregard leading to severe consequences for children, or demonstrating a complete lack of remorse.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent’s acts of cohabitation and having children outside of marriage constitute gross immorality warranting the penalty of disbarment.

RULING

No, according to the dissenting opinion. Justice Leonen argues that disbarment on the ground of immorality requires a cautious and objective standard to avoid arbitrarily policing lawyers’ private lives. He posits that the ultimate goal of disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public interest and the administration of justice. For conduct to be considered grossly immoral under the Code of Professional Responsibility, it must be so depraved that it erodes public confidence in the Rule of Law itself.
Applying this standard, the dissent finds the evidence insufficient for disbarment. The respondent’s conduct, while improper, does not meet the proposed objective criterion where immorality is tantamount to an illegal act or involves repeated indiscretions causing permanent, extraordinary difficulties to legitimate relationships. The acts are primarily private matters not directly linked to his professional duties as a lawyer, and it was not convincingly shown how they discredit the legal profession to the degree required for disbarment. However, the dissent agrees the respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Consequently, Justice Leonen votes to suspend the respondent from the practice of law for three years for gross misconduct, not disbar him for gross immorality.