GR 155087; (November, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 155087 November 28, 2003
EDUARDO T. SAYA-ANG, SR., and RICARDO T. LARA, petitioners, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Eduardo Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo Lara were candidates for Barangay Captain in the July 15, 2002 elections. On the day of the election, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 5393, denying due course to their Certificates of Candidacy on the ground that they were not residents of the barangays where they sought election. This resolution was based on a letter-report and a subsequent study by the COMELEC Law Department, all conducted without notifying the petitioners or allowing them to present evidence.
Despite the resolution, petitioners, having garnered the highest votes, were proclaimed winners on July 16, 2002, and took their oaths of office on July 31, 2002. Subsequently, the COMELEC, through memoranda and resolutions (Nos. 5584 and 5666), directed election officers to delete their names from the list of candidates, ordered them to cease from assuming office, and commanded the Boards of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the duly-elected candidates, declaring the petitioners’ proclamations void.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 5393, which denied due course to the petitioners’ certificates of candidacy without prior notice and hearing.
RULING
Yes, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside Resolution No. 5393. While the COMELEC possesses jurisdiction to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the exercise of this power is subject to the fundamental requirements of due process. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings demands notice and the opportunity to be heard.
In this case, the COMELEC’s resolution was based solely on an ex parte report and study. Petitioners were never formally notified of any proceeding against them, nor were they given any opportunity to present countervailing evidence or to refute the allegations of non-residency. This complete deprivation of the right to a hearing rendered the resolution void. The Court emphasized that the power to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is not merely a ministerial act but a quasi-judicial function requiring adherence to procedural due process.
Furthermore, the Court noted that petitioners had already been proclaimed, taken their oaths, and assumed office. Following the doctrine in Lambonao v. Tero, mandatory provisions regarding certificates of candidacy are construed as directory after the elections to give effect to the will of the electorate, especially when the people have honestly cast their ballots. The will of the voters, as clearly expressed, should not be defeated by procedural lapses of election officers where the candidates themselves were denied their basic right to be heard.