G.R. No. 99869 May 26, 1999
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO BELARO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The prosecution’s case rested primarily on the eyewitness account of Myrna Pastor, the victim’s widow. She testified that on the evening of November 2, 1989, appellant Romeo Belaro, a CAFGU member who appeared drunk and was armed with an M-16 rifle, called from outside their house. When she opened the door, she saw Belaro pointing the rifle. Frightened, she shut the door and warned her husband, Salvador Pastor. When Salvador opened the door, a volley of gunfire ensued, killing him instantly. Myrna positively identified Belaro as the assailant.
The defense interposed alibi and denial. Belaro claimed he was at the CAFGU detachment center, approximately 100 meters from the crime scene, from the afternoon until the morning after the incident. He testified he drank with companions at the detachment, felt drowsy, and slept through the night, only learning of the killing the next day. His alibi was corroborated by fellow CAFGU members and a barangay captain. The defense also insinuated the New People’s Army could have been responsible, presenting evidence that the victim was a military informant.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, overcoming his defense of alibi and the positive identification by the eyewitness.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The positive identification by the eyewitness, Myrna Pastor, who knew the appellant as a long-time family acquaintance, prevails over the defense of alibi. The Court found her testimony clear, credible, and consistent. Alibi is inherently weak and must be established with clear and convincing evidence that the accused was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the crime scene. Here, the detachment was merely 100 meters away, not an insurmountable distance, rendering the alibi untenable. The Court also noted that alibi becomes even less credible in the face of positive identification. The defense’s attempt to implicate the NPA was based on hearsay and unsubstantiated documents, which the trial court correctly disregarded. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly proven, as the attack was sudden and unexpected, depriving the unarmed victim of any chance to defend himself. However, the Court modified the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the absence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty was reduced to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.