GR 155018; (December, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 155018 ; December 11, 2003
PHILADELPHIA AGAN, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SPS. ANDRES NUEVA and DIOSDADO NUEVA, represented by LOU NUEVA and AL NUEVA, respondents.
FACTS
On April 13, 1988, spouses Andres and Diosdada Nueva sold a parcel of land to Philadelphia Agan under a pacto de retro sale for ₱21,000, with a six-month redemption period. The vendors failed to repurchase. In 1992, Agan filed a petition for consolidation of ownership. The Nuevas, in their answer, alleged the contract was an equitable mortgage, citing the property’s higher market value. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision on August 3, 2000, consolidating ownership in favor of Agan but, citing Articles 1606 and 1607 of the Civil Code, granted the vendors a 30-day period from receipt of the decision to redeem the property. The Nuevas attempted to redeem, but Agan refused the tender.
Agan, believing the redemption period was a mere unenforceable surplusage given the consolidation order, did not appeal. Instead, she filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, seeking to delete the redemption clause. The RTC granted her petition. The Nuevas’ heirs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, which reversed the RTC, holding that a petition for relief was not the proper remedy.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in granting Agan’s petition for relief from judgment.
RULING
Yes, the RTC gravely abused its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. A petition for relief under Rule 38 is an extraordinary remedy available only when a judgment is rendered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and the petitioner has no other adequate remedy. The Court clarified that the “mistake” contemplated is one of fact, not of law. Agan’s ground—her honest belief that the trial court’s grant of a redemption period was an erroneous application of the law and thus a surplusage—constitutes a mistake of law. A party’s erroneous opinion on the correctness of a judicial decision does not confer the right to relief. Since Agan was not prevented by any extrinsic circumstance from filing an ordinary appeal to correct the alleged legal error, the petition for relief was improper. The proper recourse from an adverse judgment, even if partly favorable, is an appeal, not a petition for relief. The RTC’s order amending its final decision upon an invalid petition for relief constituted grave abuse of discretion.