G.R. No. 160351 ; April 10, 2006
NOEL VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and YOLANDA CASTRO, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Noel Villanueva, a Municipal Councilor, and private complainant Yolanda Castro, the Municipal Vice-Mayor, both of Concepcion, Tarlac, were involved in a heated altercation at the municipal hall on September 12, 1994. The incident began in the morning when Villanueva, while his application for monetized leave was being processed, allegedly uttered sarcastic remarks. The confrontation escalated in the afternoon at the session hall, where Villanueva, in a loud voice heard by many, called Castro corrupt, stating she was like a “red apple” but “worm infested inside.” He also made a threatening gesture and gave her the “dirty finger.”
Two criminal complaints were filed against Villanueva: one for Grave Oral Defamation and another for Slander by Deed. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) convicted him on both counts, a decision affirmed with modification by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and later by the Court of Appeals (CA). Villanueva elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the petitioner is guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and Slander by Deed, and if the penalties and awards for damages imposed by the lower courts are correct.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the appellate court’s decision. It held that the offense committed was only Slight Oral Defamation, not Grave. The Court explained that for oral defamation to be grave, the remarks must be serious and insulting enough to be per se defamatory, considering the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances, and the language used. Here, while the words were insulting, they were uttered in the heat of anger during a mutual altercation between two public officials. The Court found the element of publicity was present, but the remarks did not attain the gravity required for the more serious crime.
Regarding Slander by Deed, the Court affirmed the conviction but classified it as simple slander, not grave. The act of giving the “dirty finger” was a contemptuous gesture tending to cause dishonor, which constitutes the crime. However, the Court found no aggravating circumstance of it being committed in a place where public authorities were engaged in their duties, as both parties were equally engaged in the altercation.
On damages, the Court deleted the awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees. Applying the principle of in pari delicto (both parties at fault), the Court ruled that Castro also contributed to the incident through her own indiscretion. Thus, each party must bear their own loss. The fines imposed were reduced accordingly.