GR 140371; (November, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 140371-72; November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents initiated intestate proceedings for the estate of Segundo Seangio. Petitioners opposed, claiming Segundo left a holographic will dated September 20, 1995, which disinherited his son Alfredo for cause. Petitioners subsequently filed a separate petition for the probate of this will, arguing testate proceedings should take precedence. The two cases were consolidated.
The purported holographic will solely contained a declaration disinheriting Alfredo, citing specific acts of disrespect and fraud. It did not name or institute any other heir, devisee, or legatee, nor did it contain any affirmative disposition of Segundo’s estate to any person. Private respondents moved to dismiss the probate petition, arguing the document was not a valid will as it effected no testamentary disposition and resulted in the preterition of all other compulsory heirs.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court correctly dismissed the petition for probate on the ground that the document, which only disinherits one heir without instituting any other, is void for preterition.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The Court clarified that while probate courts generally rule only on extrinsic validity, they may consider intrinsic validity when the defect is apparent on the face of the will. A will, by definition under Article 783 of the Civil Code, must be an act to control the disposition of one’s estate. The document in question failed this essential requirement.
The legal logic is that a mere act of disinheritance, without any concomitant institution of an heir or disposition of property, does not constitute a testamentary disposition. It is a naked exclusion that results in the preterition or omission of all compulsory heirs in the direct line. Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, the preterition of one or all compulsory heirs annuls the institution of heir. Here, there was no institution to annul; the will contained only a disinheritance clause. Consequently, the will was intrinsically void from its inception for failing to meet the definition of a will and for causing total preterition. The estate, therefore, correctly devolved by intestate succession. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the probate proceedings.
