G.R. No. 116754 ; March 17, 2000
MORONG WATER DISTRICT, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, WILFRED L. PASCASIO, RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., FRANCISCO VILLA, EDGARD STA. MARIA and EMMA CENSON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Morong Water District (MOWAD) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against its former General Manager, Edgard Sta. Maria, and LWUA Advisor Emma Censon, for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Act) and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (Malversation). The complaint alleged that Sta. Maria, with Censon’s conspiracy, received a cash advance of P33,190.73 for a pipeline project but misappropriated the funds. It claimed that a P15,000.00 partial liquidation, supported by a receipt to a certain “Engineer Ricardo Reyes,” was fictitious, as no such engineer existed per LWUA certification, and the remainder was used for an unauthorized project.
In their counter-affidavits, respondents denied the charges. Sta. Maria asserted he was ousted due to prior complaints he filed against board members and that the design plans were left in MOWAD’s office. He also indicated the cash advance was properly liquidated, with the diversion of a portion for another project authorized by the Board. Censon denied any participation in fund custody or disbursement.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order. The Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion, defined as a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The determination of probable cause is an executive function vested in the Ombudsman, and the Court will not interfere absent a clear showing of such abuse.
The Ombudsman’s finding of no probable cause was based on substantial evidence. It found that the journal vouchers and reimbursement receipts indubitably showed the cash advance was liquidated. The Ombudsman found the respondents’ version—that the funds were used for authorized purposes and that the design plans existed—more logical and believable. The allegation of conspiracy with Censon was unsubstantiated, as she had no custody over funds. While petitioner argued that demand from the Commission on Audit was unnecessary for malversation under Article 217, the Court clarified this point but noted it was not the Ombudsman’s primary basis for dismissal. The core ruling was the insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for either malversation or graft. Since the Ombudsman’s decision was grounded on substantial evidence, no grave abuse of discretion attended its issuance.