G.R. No. 173428 ; November 22, 2010
FROILAN DEJURAS, Petitioner, vs. HON. RENE C. VILLA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; the BUREAU OF AGRARIAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, the CENTER FOR LAND USE AND POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE, the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, all of the Department of Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA DELFINO; ANTHONY DELFINO; ARTEMIO ALON; and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Froilan Dejuras, representing his family’s interest, sought to compel the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to act on pending administrative matters concerning a parcel of land in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The property, now owned by SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SMPHI), was originally claimed by Dejuras’s predecessor, Eutiquio, to be tenanted agricultural land. Eutiquio initially lost a redemption case before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), won on appeal to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), but ultimately lost upon the DARAB’s reconsideration, which reinstated the PARAD’s dismissal. An entry of judgment was issued.
Subsequently, the DAR Secretary issued an order exempting the land from agrarian reform, leading to its sale to SMPHI. Facing ejectment, Dejuras filed new petitions with the DAR: one for coverage under agrarian reform and another to revoke the exemption order. While these were pending, he repeatedly sought a cease-and-desist order or injunction from the Office of the DAR Secretary to halt SMPHI’s construction. After no action was taken on these urgent motions for over a year, Dejuras filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals to compel the DAR Secretary to resolve the pending motion for injunctive relief.

ISSUE

Whether a writ of mandamus lies to compel the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to act on a pending motion for the issuance of a cease-and-desist order or writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals’ dismissal. The Court held that mandamus is a remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a cease-and-desist order is a discretionary act, requiring the exercise of judgment on the existence of a clear legal right, a material and substantial invasion of that right, and the balance of convenience in favor of the applicant. The DAR Secretary’s inaction or delay in resolving such an application, while potentially constituting an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari, does not give rise to a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. The Court emphasized that mandamus cannot control or review the exercise of discretion, only command action where the law specifically enjoins a performance. Since the grant of provisional relief involves the evaluation of facts and circumstances, it is discretionary, and the Secretary cannot be compelled via mandamus to issue such an order. The proper recourse for the alleged delay or inaction was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not mandamus under Rule 65 for a purely ministerial act.