G.R. Nos. 151380-91, December 10, 2004
Engr. Jose K. Tupaz, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Salvador Y. Apurillo, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, consisting of DPWH engineers and private contractors, were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City with multiple counts of violation of PD 1759 and estafa through falsification of public documents. The criminal Informations were filed by Special Prosecutors from the Office of the Ombudsman. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan, which held that the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial power is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners moved to quash the Informations. The RTC, through Judge Apurillo, granted the motion and dismissed the cases without prejudice in an Order dated January 23, 2001.
The prosecution did not appeal this dismissal order. Instead, nearly a month after the order had attained finality, the prosecution filed a motion to revive the criminal cases, citing the subsequent ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan on motion for reconsideration, which clarified that the Ombudsman could prosecute cases filed before the ruling’s effectivity. Judge Apurillo granted the motion to revive via an Order dated July 4, 2001, effectively reinstating the cases. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reviving the criminal cases after the dismissal order had attained finality.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that Judge Apurillo acted with grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of finality of judgments. The RTC’s January 23, 2001 Order of dismissal became final and executory after the prosecution failed to perfect an appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. A final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable; it can no longer be modified, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The only recognized exceptions are for the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, or where the judgment is void.
The prosecution’s attempt to revive the cases via a motion was a substantive act that effectively altered the final order of dismissal. The subsequent clarification in the Uy case did not justify the revival. The proper recourse for the prosecution, if it believed the dismissal was erroneous, was to appeal the order within the reglementary period. Having allowed the order to lapse into finality, the prosecution and the trial court were bound by its consequences. Therefore, the act of reviving the cases after finality was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to grave abuse of discretion. The assailed July 4, 2001 Order and December 3, 2001 Resolution were set aside.