GR 172608; (February, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 172608 February 6, 2007
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Bernard Mapalo, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Bernard Mapalo was charged with Murder for the killing of Manuel Piamonte. The prosecution’s lone eyewitness, Calixto Garcia, testified that during a dance in the early morning of February 13, 1994, a fight erupted between Piamonte and a group including Mapalo. Garcia saw Mapalo strike Piamonte on the head from behind with a lead pipe. He later saw Piamonte’s dead body with multiple stab wounds but admitted he did not witness the stabbing incident itself and could not identify who inflicted the fatal wounds.
Mapalo interposed the defense of alibi, claiming he was at home sleeping at the time of the incident, a claim corroborated by his wife. The Regional Trial Court convicted him of Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction to Frustrated Murder, finding that the prosecution failed to prove that the stab wounds, which were the cause of death, were inflicted by Mapalo.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly convicted accused-appellant of Frustrated Murder instead of Murder.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the modification of the conviction from Murder to Frustrated Murder. The legal logic hinges on the principle of conspiracy and the specific proof required for a conviction. While Garcia’s testimony positively identified Mapalo as the one who clubbed the victim, it was unequivocally established that Garcia did not see who stabbed Piamonte. The fatal injuries were the multiple stab wounds, not the head injury from the pipe.
For conspiracy to be established, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt of a common design and concerted action. The mere presence of Mapalo at the scene and his act of hitting the victim with a pipe, without clear evidence that this act was in direct concert with the unknown assailants who delivered the fatal stabs, is insufficient to hold him liable for the killing itself. His individual criminal liability is thus limited to the natural and probable consequence of his own overt act. Since the head injury alone was not proven to be fatal, his act constituted frustrated murder—an attempt to kill that did not result in death because of causes independent of his will, i.e., the fatal wounds were inflicted by another. The prosecution failed to prove that Mapalo conspired in the stabbing or that his act of clubbing directly caused the victim’s death.