A.M. No. P-04-1808. June 27, 2005. RE: CONVICTION OF IMELDA B. FORTUS, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 40, CALAPAN CITY FOR THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22.
FACTS

This administrative case originated from a complaint filed by Judge Tomas C. Leynes against his staff member, Imelda B. Fortus, a Clerk III. The complaint was based on Fortus’s conviction by the Municipal Trial Court of Calapan City for three counts of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law). Judge Leynes asserted that this crime involves moral turpitude and, under Civil Service rules, warrants dismissal from service even for a first offense. He further contended that the grant of probation to Fortus did not negate this administrative liability, as probation does not erase the fact of conviction.
In her comment, Fortus admitted the convictions but defended herself by citing the grant of probation. She argued that the purpose of probation is the reformation of the offender and that this should preclude her dismissal from the service. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), after evaluation, recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that Fortus be dismissed.

ISSUE

Whether a court employee convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, but subsequently granted probation, should be dismissed from the service.

RULING

Yes, the employee must be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the OCA’s recommendation. The legal logic is clear and sequential. First, violation of B.P. 22 has been definitively characterized by the Court as a crime involving moral turpitude, as it imports deceit and reflects on one’s moral character. Second, under the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a grave offense punishable by dismissal upon first commission.
The Court explicitly rejected Fortus’s defense based on probation. It held that while probation suspends the execution of the criminal sentence, it does not remove the finality of the conviction itself for administrative purposes. A judgment of conviction attains finality when the accused applies for probation. Consequently, the disqualification arising from a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude “subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.” The reformative purpose of probation does not override the specific disciplinary mandates of the civil service laws applicable to court personnel. Therefore, Fortus was ordered dismissed from the service. The Court, however, noted she may be allowed to re-enter government service upon a future satisfactory showing of fitness to serve.