GR 159085; (February, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 159085 , 159103, 159185 & 159196. February 3, 2004.
SANLAKAS, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, ET AL., and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS
On July 27, 2003, approximately 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) seized the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. They publicly denounced corruption in the AFP and demanded the resignation of high-ranking officials, including the President. In response, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, declaring a “state of rebellion” and calling upon the AFP and the Philippine National Police to suppress it. The Oakwood standoff ended peacefully through negotiation later that same day.
Despite the peaceful resolution, the declaration of a state of rebellion was not lifted until August 1, 2003, via Proclamation No. 435. Several petitions were filed before the Supreme Court, challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427. The petitioners, including party-list organizations, members of the House of Representatives, and a Senator, argued that the declaration was unconstitutional, that it granted the President emergency powers, and that it justified warrantless arrests and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without congressional authority.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the President’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” under Proclamation No. 427 is constitutional.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 427. The Court ruled that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely a factual pronouncement by the President, confirming the existence of an ongoing rebellion as defined under the Revised Penal Code. This declaration, by itself, did not create or confer any new powers upon the President.
The legal logic is anchored on the distinction between a factual declaration and a grant of authority. The President’s act of calling out the armed forces to suppress the rebellion was explicitly authorized by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution , which states: “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” The Court emphasized that this “calling out” power is a discretionary act solely vested in the President, the wisdom of which is not subject to judicial review. The declaration was a superfluity but not an illegal act, as it did not trigger any of the extraordinary emergency powers that require congressional approval, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law. The measures taken, including alleged warrantless arrests, were to be judged on their own merits under prevailing laws, not invalidated by the proclamation itself.
