G.R. No. 159218; March 30, 2004
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Salvador S. Abunado was legally married to Narcisa Arceño on September 18, 1967. In 1988, Narcisa left to work in Japan. Upon her return in 1992, she discovered Salvador was cohabiting with another woman and had contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Biñas on January 10, 1989. A bigamy case was filed against Salvador and Zenaida on May 18, 1995. During the trial, Salvador admitted to an earlier union with Zenaida in 1955, which lacked evidence, prompting their 1989 remarriage at their son’s request for military commission purposes. Salvador also filed an annulment case against Narcisa in January 1995 and eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage on October 29, 1999.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Salvador of bigamy, a decision affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, which considered his age as a mitigating circumstance. Petitioner Zenaida was acquitted. Salvador elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review, raising several defenses.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Salvador Abunado’s conviction for bigamy despite his claims of a defective information, alleged consent from the first wife, and the existence of a prejudicial question due to the subsequent annulment of his first marriage.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction. First, the alleged defect in the information—a typographical error stating the crime was committed in “January 1995” instead of the correct date “January 10, 1989” specified within the same information—did not invalidate it. The information sufficiently informed Salvador of the charge, and he failed to object during trial, curing any defect. Second, Narcisa’s alleged consent to the second marriage is immaterial. Bigamy is a public offense against the state, and pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal liability. Third, the pendency or even the eventual grant of the annulment of the first marriage is not a prejudicial question that would suspend or negate the bigamy case. A prejudicial question exists only if the resolution of the civil case determines the guilt or innocence in the criminal case. Here, the crime of bigamy was already complete when Salvador contracted the second marriage in 1989 while his first marriage was still legally subsisting. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity does not retroactively absolve him of criminal liability incurred prior to such declaration. All elements of bigamy—a valid first marriage, the contracting of a second marriage before the first is legally dissolved, and both marriages possessing the essential requisites for validity—were proven beyond reasonable doubt.