GR 158687; (January, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 158687 ; January 27, 2006
FRISCO F. DOMALSIN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JUANITO VALENCIANO and AMALIA VALENCIANO, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Frisco Domalsin filed a forcible entry complaint against respondent spouses Juanito and Amalia Valenciano before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Domalsin claimed prior physical possession of a parcel of land in Tuba, Benguet, since 1979, supported by a tax declaration and improvements like a private road and fruit-bearing trees. He alleged that on August 1, 1998, the Valencianos, by force and strategy, entered the land and began constructing a building without his consent. The Valencianos countered that the construction was with the consent of a prior resident, Gloria Banuca, and that the improvements were introduced by other residents, not Domalsin.
The MCTC ruled in favor of Domalsin, declaring him the prior possessor and ordering the Valencianos to vacate. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed this decision. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, finding that Domalsin failed to prove his prior physical possession. The CA noted his tax declaration pertained to a different lot and that his possession was merely occasional due to his sand and gravel business, not the continuous possession required for forcible entry.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the lower courts’ findings and in ruling that Domalsin failed to substantiate his prior physical possession of the disputed property for purposes of an action for forcible entry.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MCTC decision. The Court held that in forcible entry cases, the plaintiff must prove prior physical possession that was unjustly deprived by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The sole issue is possession de facto, independent of claims of ownership. Domalsin sufficiently established his prior possession through testimonial and documentary evidence.
The legal logic centers on the nature of possession. Domalsin’s acts—constructing a private road, erecting houses for laborers, planting trees, and securing government permits for his business—constituted acts of dominion demonstrating prior physical possession. The tax declaration, while not conferring title, corroborated his claim. His possession was not rendered intermittent merely because his business was seasonal; the key is the intent to possess, which he maintained. The Valencianos’ entry in 1998, without Domalsin’s consent and while he still claimed possession, constituted the force or strategy contemplated under the rules. Therefore, as the prior possessor, Domalsin was entitled to restitution of possession under the summary action for forcible entry.