G.R. No. L-66479 November 21, 1991
JUANITO GONZALES and CORONACION GONZALES, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSITA LOPEZ, GAVINO CAYABYAB, AGUEDA UBANDO, FELIPA UBANDO, PEDRO SORIANO, TEODISIA LOPEZ and FEDERICO BALLESTEROS, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents, claiming to be co-owners, filed a complaint for partition in 1965 against Fausto Soy over a parcel of land. They anchored their claim on being descendants of Fausto Soy’s sisters, asserting a pro-indiviso three-fourths share. Fausto Soy defended his exclusive ownership, citing his Torrens title issued in 1932. The trial court initially ruled for partition in 1974. During execution, however, petitioners Juanito and Coronacion Gonzales filed a third-party claim, asserting they were the registered owners of portions of the lot, having purchased from Fausto Soy in 1954 and 1960, with their titles issued in 1960.
Petitioners successfully moved to intervene, arguing they were indispensable parties not impleaded. The trial court granted intervention, vacated its 1974 decision, and ordered a new trial. The case was submitted on a stipulation of facts confirming petitioners’ purchases and titles. The trial court then dismissed the complaint, finding the action barred by prescription and laches. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed, reinstating the 1974 partition order, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the action for partition filed by private respondents is barred by prescription and laches.

RULING

Yes, the action is barred. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal. The legal logic proceeds from the nature of the claim. Private respondents’ action, while denominated as partition, was in substance an action to reconvey property based on an implied trust, alleging Fausto Soy held title for himself and his sisters. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the title that constitutes a repudiation of the trust.
The reckoning point was 1932, when Original Certificate of Title No. 49661 was issued solely in Fausto Soy’s name. This issuance was a clear, constructive repudiation of any co-ownership. Private respondents filed their suit only in 1965, thirty-three years later, well beyond the prescriptive period. Even assuming no repudiation, the claim is barred by laches. Their unreasonable delay of over three decades in asserting their rights, while Fausto Soy and subsequently the petitioners-in-good-faith exercised acts of ownership, constitutes acquiescence. The law cannot protect those who sleep on their rights. The Torrens titles acquired by the petitioners, who were not parties to the original suit, must be respected.