G.R. No. 123176; October 13, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELCHOR RAFAEL y LEGASPI, MARIO RAFAEL y LEGASPI, and MAXIMO RAFAEL y MACASIEB, accused, MAXIMO RAFAEL y MACASIEB, accused-appellant.

FACTS

On August 28, 1994, in Quezon City, accused-appellant Maximo Rafael and his two sons, Melchor and Mario, barged into the kitchen where Alejandra Macaraeg-Rafael and her daughter-in-law, Gloria Tuatis-Rafael, were preparing dinner. Melchor, armed with a bolo, immediately hacked Alejandra, severing her left hand, and then turned to attack Gloria. Mario also participated in the assault. Appellant, though unarmed, stood by the kitchen door. Alejandra, who feigned death after being repeatedly stabbed, heard appellant shout in their dialect, “Patayin, patayin iran amen!” (Kill them all!). Gloria was chased outside and killed, while Alejandra survived after receiving medical treatment. Appellant and his sons were charged with Murder for Gloria’s death and Frustrated Murder for the attack on Alejandra. Only appellant was arrested and tried, as his sons remained at large. The prosecution established the events through eyewitness accounts, including that of victim Alejandra. The defense consisted of alibi and denial, claiming appellant was elsewhere at the time.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether accused-appellant Maximo Rafael is criminally liable for the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder, and if so, the degree of his participation.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s criminal liability but modified the degree of his participation and the penalties. The Court found the defense of alibi weak and unsubstantiated, especially against the positive identification by the eyewitness, Alejandra. Her testimony that appellant was present during the attack and shouted encouragement to kill was deemed credible and sufficient to establish his involvement. However, the Court ruled that appellant’s actions constituted cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, making him liable as an accomplice, not as a principal. He did not directly inflict the wounds, but his presence and shouted exhortation provided moral assistance to his sons, the direct perpetrators, facilitating the commission of the crimes. For the Murder of Gloria, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present, but appellant, as an accomplice, is liable for the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for principals. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was modified to an indeterminate penalty. For the Frustrated Murder of Alejandra, appellant was also held liable as an accomplice. The Court ordered him to pay civil indemnities, actual, and moral damages to the victims’ heirs.