GR 161414; (January, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 161414 ; January 17, 2005
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, et al., respondents.
FACTS
In 1965, the Supreme Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General declared Executive Order No. 107, which created the Municipality of Andong in Lanao del Sur, null and void ab initio. The Court held that the President lacked the legislative power to create municipalities. Despite this judicial annulment, petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid alleges that Andong has continued to function as a de facto municipality for decades, with appointed officials and basic public services, and is recognized by some government agencies.
Camid filed this petition assailing a 2003 Certification from the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) which listed eighteen other municipalities—whose creations were also voided in Pelaez—as “existing,” while excluding Andong. He claims this constitutes grave abuse of discretion and unequal treatment, praying for the Court to order Andong’s recognition as a regular municipality.
ISSUE
Whether the Municipality of Andong, having been declared void ab initio in Pelaez v. Auditor General, can now be legally recognized as an existing municipality.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition. The legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of stare decisis and the conclusive effect of a judicial declaration of nullity. The Court in Pelaez definitively ruled that Executive Order No. 107 was void ab initio, meaning it was legally inexistent from its inception. A void act cannot give rise to any legal rights or obligations. The subsequent de facto existence or operation of Andong, no matter how prolonged, cannot cure this fundamental legal defect. The municipality never attained a legal personality.
The recognition of the other eighteen municipalities by the DILG is legally distinct and does not constitute unequal treatment. As clarified by the Court, those municipalities were subsequently validly created by congressional statutes or presidential decrees issued under proper authority, thereby conferring upon them a new and legitimate legal existence. Andong, in contrast, has never been re-created by a valid legislative act. Therefore, the DILG correctly excluded it from its list of existing municipalities. The petition fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion warranting the extraordinary writ of certiorari.