G.R. No. 172602 August 8, 2008
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO A.P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.

FACTS

This case involves a contempt charge against newspaper columnist Amado A.P. Macasaet. In September 2007, Macasaet published a series of columns in Malaya alleging that a member of the Supreme Court had received a bribe. The columns described a delivery of five boxes containing P10 million in cash to the Court, received by a staff member named “Cecilia” of an unnamed lady Justice. The story, based on confidential sources, claimed the bribe was connected to a decision acquitting a Filipino-Chinese businessman. An online magazine, Newsbreak, later published a similar report specifically naming Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and her former staff, Cecilia Delis. Justice Santiago denied the allegations and requested an investigation.
The Court en banc required Macasaet to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. A Committee was formed to receive evidence. Macasaet, the Newsbreak writers, and Delis testified. The informants relied on confidential sources, while Delis denied the story, stating she had resigned months prior and never received any boxes. The Committee determined the case referenced was G.R. No. 172602 (Henry T. Go v. Sandiganbayan), where a Special Third Division, in a resolution penned by Justice Santiago, had granted Go’s motion for reconsideration. The Committee found Macasaet’s publications false, baseless, and malicious, concluding they generated public distrust in the judiciary.

ISSUE

Whether Amado A.P. Macasaet should be held liable for indirect contempt of court for his published columns alleging bribery within the Supreme Court.

RULING

No. The dissenting opinion argues that Macasaet should not be held in contempt. The legal logic centers on the nature of the proceeding and the standard for contempt against a journalist. This is a criminal contempt proceeding under Section 3(d), Rule 71, with the narrow purpose of determining if the publications impede the administration of justice. The dissent emphasizes the jurisdictional delineation: determining actual bribery for impeachment is a power vested solely in Congress, not the Court in this contempt proceeding.
Critically, the dissent disagrees with the majority’s application of the standard from In Re: Emil P. Jurado. While the majority finds Macasaet’s failure to verify his story sufficient for contempt, the dissent argues that for a journalist, the contumacious act must be clear, willful, and calculated to obstruct justice. Mere falsity or negligence in verification, without a showing of actual malice or a specific intent to degrade the court, is insufficient. The power to punish for contempt must be exercised with restraint, not to suppress criticism but to protect a paramount governmental function. The dissent concludes that absent a clear showing of an intent to obstruct justice, punishing Macasaet risks chilling protected speech and undermines the interdependent roles of a free press and an independent judiciary. The proper remedy for defamatory falsehoods, if any, lies in a separate civil or criminal action for libel.