GR 137549; (February, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 137549 ; February 11, 2005
AURELIO P. ALONZO and TERESITA A. SISON, petitioners, vs. JAIME AND PERLITA SAN JUAN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, the registered owners of a parcel of land, filed a complaint for recovery of possession against respondents who occupied a portion without consent. During the pendency of the case, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, which the trial court approved via a Judgment by Compromise. The agreement stipulated that respondents would purchase the occupied portion through installment payments. A critical provision stated that should any two installments remain unpaid, the agreement would be considered automatically null and void, with the initial payment forfeited as penalty and rentals.
Petitioners later filed an Amended Motion for Execution, alleging respondents failed to pay the installments due on July 31 and August 31, 1997. The trial court denied the motion. It ruled that under the clear terms of paragraph 11 of the Compromise Agreement, the failure to pay two installments rendered the agreement null and void. Consequently, the court held it had no basis to issue a writ of execution to enforce the now-void agreement. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for execution by declaring the Compromise Agreement null and void due to respondents’ failure to pay two installments.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s orders. The legal logic is that a compromise agreement, once approved by the court, has the force of res judicata and is immediately executory. The provision stating the agreement becomes “null and void” upon default of two installments is a resolutory condition. Its effect is not to render the entire agreement void ab initio, but to terminate the obligations thereunder and restore the parties to their original positions, subject to the forfeiture clause.
The Court clarified that the term “null and void” in the contract was a stipulation by the parties on the consequences of breach, not a declaration of absolute nullity. The agreement remained valid until the breach occurred. Upon respondents’ default, the petitioners’ right to seek execution of the judgment was triggered. The forfeited initial payment served as liquidated damages for the breach. Therefore, the trial court had a clear basisβthe breached judgmentβto issue a writ of execution to enforce the consequences of the breach, namely, the respondents’ vacation of the property and the forfeiture of the payment. The trial court’s interpretation erroneously deprived the approved compromise judgment of its executory force.
