G.R. No. L-38383 May 27, 1981
WILLELMO C. FORTUN, petitioner, vs. RUFINO O. LABANG, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pagadian City; Attorney MARTIN VERA CRUZ; and Attorneys ANDRES BERSALES, PABLITO PIELAGO GLICERIO CARPIO, SANTIAGO EISMA, and LEONARDO ZULUETA, as President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Director, respectively, of the Zamboanga del Sur and Pagadian City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Judge Willelmo C. Fortun was subjected to a preliminary investigation by respondent City Fiscal Rufino O. Labang based on a letter-complaint alleging irregularities in his gasoline allowance. The complaint originated from respondent Atty. Martin Vera Cruz, a lawyer who had lost six out of nine cases in petitioner’s sala, and a supporting affidavit from a disgruntled former employee. The complaint was endorsed to the City Fiscal by five members of the local Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) chapter’s Board of Directors, several of whom were also alleged to have motives against the Judge. The Fiscal issued a subpoena to Judge Fortun, which was served publicly in a crowded courtroom as the Judge was about to begin a session.
Judge Fortun contested the subpoena’s legality and moved for the complaint’s dismissal, arguing the investigation was oppressive and violated procedures. His motion was denied, prompting this petition for prohibition and certiorari. He alleged the Fiscal acted with precipitate haste, failed to comply with the sworn statement requirement under Presidential Decree No. 77, and ignored the confidential procedure for complaints against judges under the rules.

ISSUE

Whether the writs of prohibition and certiorari should be granted to restrain the preliminary investigation against Judge Fortun on grounds of oppressive and vindictive use of the strong arm of the law.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the writs. The Court applied the established exception that while it generally will not restrain criminal enforcement, prohibition lies to prevent the oppressive or vindictive use of the law’s strong arm. The legal logic centered on the clear evidence of harassment and bad faith, which tainted the proceedings from their inception.
The complaint’s origin from parties with demonstrable grievances—a lawyer with a poor record before the Judge’s court and a disgruntled former employee—established an improper motive. The subsequent endorsement by a divided IBP board, whose acting members themselves had “axes to grind,” further indicated the charge was weaponized. The City Fiscal’s procedural missteps, including the public and dramatic service of the subpoena in open court, disregarded the sensitivity of the office and the confidentiality intended for such proceedings. This pattern transformed a potential administrative matter into an instrument of harassment, undermining the orderly administration of justice. The Court thus held the investigation was conducted in an oppressive manner, warranting judicial intervention to dismiss the complaint and make the restraining order permanent.