G.R. No. 165879 ; November 10, 2006
MARIA B. CHING, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR., EVELYN GOYANKO, JERRY GOYANKO, IMELDA GOYANKO, JULIUS GOYANKO, MARY ELLEN GOYANKO AND JESS GOYANKO, Respondents.

FACTS

Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married in 1947. During their marriage, a 661-square meter property in Cebu City was acquired in 1961. Due to the spouses’ Chinese citizenship at the time, title was placed in the name of Sulpicia Ventura, Joseph’s aunt. In 1993, Sulpicia sold the property to Joseph, who subsequently executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Maria B. Ching, his common-law wife. Title was then issued in Ching’s name. After Joseph’s death in 1996, his legitimate children (respondents) discovered the transfer. They filed a complaint for recovery of property, initially alleging forgery of their father’s signature on the deed of sale in favor of Ching.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding the validity of the sale and the genuineness of the signature. It also found that Ching provided the purchase price and that the property was not conjugal, as it was merely held temporarily by Joseph before the sale to Ching.

ISSUE

Whether the deed of sale executed by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife, Maria B. Ching, over a property presumed conjugal, is valid.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision declaring the sale null and void. The legal logic is anchored on public policy and property relations. First, the property, acquired during the subsistence of Joseph’s marriage to Epifania, is conclusively presumed conjugal under the Civil Code. Joseph could not validly alienate it without his wife’s consent. Second, and decisively, the sale violated specific prohibitions under the Civil Code. Article 1490 prohibits sales between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the sale. Article 1409 declares contracts expressly prohibited or contrary to public policy, like this one, void from the beginning. The Court emphasized that the prohibition is absolute and not dependent on the fairness of the price or the good faith of the parties. The change in the respondents’ theory from forgery to a violation of public policy was permissible because the nullity of the contract is based on its illegality per se, which can be raised at any time. Petitioner’s claim of providing the purchase price was deemed insufficient to overcome the legal presumption of conjugality or to validate an otherwise prohibited and void contract.