GR 157906; (November, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 157906 ; November 2, 2006
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner, vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA CARDAÑA, Respondents.
FACTS
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña, a 12-year-old student, was walking along the perimeter fence of San Roque Elementary School when a branch from a dead caimito tree within the school premises fell and killed her. Her parents, the respondents, filed a damages suit against the petitioner, the school principal. They alleged that as early as December 15, 1992, a barangay resident, Eufronio Lerios, had reported to the petitioner the potential danger posed by the tree. The respondents contended the principal’s gross negligence caused their daughter’s death. The petitioner denied negligence, claiming Lerios only offered to buy the tree and she had no knowledge it was dead and rotting. She presented witnesses stating she assigned a teacher to negotiate the sale after a meeting.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner, as school principal, was negligent and therefore liable for damages arising from the death of Jasmin Cardaña.
RULING
Yes, the petitioner was negligent and liable. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ finding of negligence, modifying only the award of moral damages. The legal logic proceeds from the elements of a quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code: damages, fault or negligence, and a causal connection. The Court found all elements present. The death and burial expenses were proven damages. On negligence, the Court held that the probability of a branch from a dead and rotting tree falling was a foreseeable danger. As principal, the petitioner had a duty to maintain school grounds and ensure safety. Her claim of ignorance about the tree’s condition was insufficient; by mere sighting, she should have known it was a nuisance requiring removal. The act of merely delegating the task of disposal after an offer to purchase, without ensuring prompt action to abate the clear hazard, constituted a failure to exercise the degree of care required of an ordinary prudent person in her position. The causal link between this failure and the fatal accident was direct. However, the Court deleted the award for moral damages, as there was no clear evidence of bad faith or ill motive on the petitioner’s part, only negligence. Thus, the petitioner was ordered to pay indemnity for death and actual burial expenses.