G.R. No. L-60819, January 28, 1983
Lamberto del Rosario vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch VI, Baliuag, Bulacan, Maximo M. Andal as Deputy Sheriff, and Benita Martinez

FACTS

Petitioner Lamberto del Rosario filed an agrarian case against respondent Benita Martinez, claiming he was her share-tenant and seeking confirmation of his tenancy status, lease rental fixation, and reliquidation of harvests. Martinez denied the allegations, asserting del Rosario was merely a hired laborer, and filed a counterclaim for damages. After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaim. This dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Martinez subsequently moved for a writ of execution. The Deputy Sheriff, after reviewing the dispositive portion of the decision which only stated the dismissal of the case and counterclaim, returned the writ as satisfied, finding “nothing to be executed.” However, the respondent judge issued a new order granting execution, directing del Rosario to vacate the landholding. The judge based this on findings within the decision’s body, which declared del Rosario a mere laborer with no tenancy rights.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution that ordered the petitioner to vacate the land, despite the dispositive portion of the final decision containing no such directive for ejectment.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, annulling the challenged order. The Court held that the execution must conform strictly to the judgment as expressed in its dispositive portion. The dispositive part of the August 22, 1980, decision unequivocally dismissed the case and the counterclaim, with no pronouncement as to costs and, critically, no order for del Rosario to deliver possession of the land to Martinez.
While the body of the decision contained findings that del Rosario was a mere laborer, the rule is that where the dispositive part of a final and executory judgment is clear and unambiguous, it alone vests rights and is the source of the executing court’s authority. The court cannot, under the guise of execution, modify the final judgment by reading into its dispositive portion a relief not expressly granted. To order ejectment was to alter the judgment, which had become immutable. The proper course for Martinez, if she sought possession, was to institute a separate action, not to secure it through an expansive interpretation in an execution proceeding. The respondent judge thus committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.