G.R. No. 120905 & G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996.
RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROGELIO DE CASTRO, respondents. JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RENATO U. REYES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Renato U. Reyes, the incumbent Mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, was administratively charged before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On February 6, 1995, the Sanggunian found him guilty and ordered his removal from office. Reyes filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). After the TRO expired and no injunction was issued, attempts to serve the decision on Reyes were refused. Despite this, on March 20, 1995, Reyes filed his certificate of candidacy for the upcoming May 1995 elections.
Private respondent Rogelio de Castro sought Reyes’s disqualification under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code, which bars those removed via administrative case from running. The COMELEC Second Division disqualified Reyes and cancelled his certificate of candidacy on May 9, 1995. Unaware of this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Reyes the winner on May 10, 1995. The COMELEC en banc later affirmed the disqualification and set aside his proclamation. In a separate petition, Julius O. Garcia, who garnered the second-highest votes, sought his own proclamation as mayor following Reyes’s disqualification.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Reyes based on a removal order that was allegedly not yet final; and (2) Whether Garcia, as the second-placer, is entitled to be proclaimed winner.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, upholding the COMELEC’s resolutions. On the first issue, the Court ruled that the administrative decision of removal against Reyes had become final and executory. Reyes’s act of filing a petition before the RTC did not suspend the finality of the Sanggunian’s decision, as the proper remedy was an appeal to the Office of the President under the Local Government Code, not a special civil action. His refusal to accept service of the decision did not affect its finality. Consequently, his disqualification under Section 40(b) was valid, and his subsequent election did not absolve him or render the administrative case moot.
On the second issue, the Court affirmed the settled doctrine that the candidate who receives the second-highest number of votes is not entitled to be proclaimed winner simply because the first-placer is disqualified. An election is a contest for the people’s choice; the second-placer is just that—the second choice, not the winner. A contrary rule would be undemocratic. Therefore, Garcia’s petition was correctly denied. The Court also noted that the position would be deemed vacant, to be filled according to law.