G.R. No. L-39378 August 28, 1984
Generosa Ayson-Simon, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nicolas Adamos and Vicenta Feria, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

On May 29, 1946, defendants-appellants Nicolas Adamos and Vicenta Feria sold two lots to plaintiff-appellee Generosa Ayson-Simon. The defendants had originally purchased these lots in 1943, but that prior sale was later annulled in a separate case (Civil Case No. 174), with the judgment attaining finality on May 3, 1967. Due to the defendants’ failure to deliver titles and possession, Ayson-Simon first filed an action for specific performance in 1963 (Civil Case No. Q-7275), which was granted. However, execution of that judgment became impossible after the annulment of the defendants’ own title in Civil Case No. 174.
Consequently, on August 16, 1968, Ayson-Simon filed the present action for rescission of the sale and recovery of the purchase price. The defendants appealed, contending that the action for rescission had prescribed, arguing that the four-year prescriptive period began from the date of the sale in 1946. They also asserted that by first filing for specific performance, Ayson-Simon had waived her right to seek rescission, as these are alternative remedies under the law.

ISSUE

The core issues are: (1) whether the plaintiff’s prior action for specific performance bars her subsequent action for rescission; and (2) whether the action for rescission had already prescribed.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, ruling for the plaintiff. On the first issue, the Court held that the rule prohibiting cumulative remedies of fulfillment and rescission applies when the obligation is still possible of fulfillment. Citing Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the Court explained that an injured party may seek rescission even after having chosen fulfillment if the latter subsequently becomes impossible. The final judgment in Civil Case No. 174, which nullified the defendants’ title, rendered fulfillment impossible. Thus, the plaintiff’s prior action for specific performance did not constitute a waiver of her right to rescind.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the action had not prescribed. The cause of action for rescission under Article 1191, due to impossibility of fulfillment, arose only when the judgment in Civil Case No. 174 became final and executory on May 3, 1967. It was from this date that the four-year prescriptive period began to run. Since the complaint for rescission was filed on August 16, 1968, well within the four-year period, the action was timely. Therefore, the defendants were ordered to return the purchase price with legal interest.