GR 152343; (January, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 152343 ; January 18, 2008
MA. FE BACOS, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO ARCEGA, respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Domingo Arcega secured a final and executory Labor Arbiter decision for illegal dismissal and monetary claims against Viabel International Garments, Inc. and/or Marlon Viado. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied twenty-eight sewing machines belonging to the judgment debtors. Petitioner Ma. Fe Bacos filed a third-party claim, asserting ownership over the levied machines by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 26, 1998, executed prior to the levy, wherein Marlon Viado purportedly sold them to her.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the third-party claim, finding the Deed of Absolute Sale spurious. This dismissal was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter and NLRC noted the document’s questionable authenticity, particularly the failure of the notary public to include it in his notarial report and file a copy with the Clerk of Court. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied Bacos’s petition for certiorari, upholding the findings of the lower tribunals.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioner’s third-party claim over the levied sewing machines.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The legal logic centers on the requirements for a valid third-party claim under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, which are analogous to Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule mandates that a third-party claimant must not only submit an affidavit of title but must also substantiate the claim with convincing evidence of ownership or right to possession.
The Court upheld the concurrent factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Court of Appeals that the Deed of Absolute Sale presented by Bacos was spurious. Critical to this conclusion was the document’s absence from the notary public’s official records filed with the Clerk of Court, which the appellate court correctly deemed a “badge of fraud and simulation.” Petitioner failed to provide other corroborative evidence, such as testimony from the notary public, to validate her claim. The Supreme Court, not being a trier of facts, accorded finality to these factual determinations, which were supported by evidence. Consequently, the third-party claim was properly dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis.