GR L 52241; (November, 1984) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-52241 November 19, 1984
PEDRO M. AZUL, doing business under the names and styles of JERLYN TRADING & CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES & BERLYN SERVICE CENTER, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX at Quezon City, and ROSALINDA P. TECSON, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Rosalinda Tecson filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Azul. Azul received the complaint on March 27, 1979, and filed a motion for a 15-day extension to file a responsive pleading. The temporarily presiding judge granted only a 5-day extension from April 11, 1979. Before Azul received this order, the newly assigned respondent Judge Jose Castro, on his first day in office on April 18, 1979, issued an order declaring Azul in default for failing to file an answer within the shortened period he had not yet officially received. Ex-parte presentation of evidence was immediately conducted, leading to a decision dated April 27, 1979, awarding Tecson over P1.1 million, including substantial damages and attorney’s fees, based on a principal claim of P250,092.55.
Upon learning of the default, Azul filed a motion to lift the order of default together with his answer on May 2, 1979, and later a motion for new trial after receiving the adverse decision. The respondent court denied these motions, labeling the motion for new trial as pro-forma. The court also initially denied Azul’s motion for extension to file a record on appeal due to a clerical error in the stated date of receipt of the decision, later granted it, but ultimately dismissed the appeal upon Tecson’s opposition.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to a denial of due process, in declaring the petitioner in default and in the subsequent proceedings that barred him from presenting his defense.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, finding a denial of due process. The constitutional guarantee of due process is fundamentally concerned with fair procedure, anchored on the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The respondent court gravely abused its discretion in declaring Azul in default for failing to meet a responsive pleading deadline set by an order he had not yet received. This deprived him of the basic procedural safeguard of being heard. The subsequent denial of his motions to lift the default and for a new trial, based on a perfunctory “pro-forma” finding, and the erratic handling of his appeal, which ultimately dismissed it, compounded this deprivation. The Court emphasized that default judgments are disfavored, and courts must exercise utmost caution before depriving a party of the right to defend. The extravagant award rendered after an ex-parte hearing further underscored the prejudice. All challenged orders and the decision were set aside as null and void. The case was remanded for trial on the merits with instructions to admit Azul’s answer.
