G.R. No. L-72727; July 30, 1987
BENITO DILAG, SUSETTE DILAG, SUSSIE DILAG and SUSAN DILAG, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND MARCIANO ARELLANO, respondents.

FACTS

Marciano Arellano obtained a final money judgment against spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag. To satisfy this judgment, the sheriff levied upon and sold at public auction on August 26, 1981, Lot No. 288, registered under the Dilag spouses’ name. The Certificate of Sale was inscribed on the title the following day. The spouses failed to redeem the property, leading to the issuance of a final deed of sale and a writ of possession in Arellano’s favor. Arellano was placed in material possession on December 22, 1982, and he subsequently sold the lot to third parties.
The petitioners, children of the judgment debtors, filed a separate civil case to annul the judgment and all subsequent proceedings. They claimed ownership of the lot by virtue of a 1973 Deed of Sale from their parents, which was annotated as an adverse claim on the title. They also secured a 1981 deed of sale from their parents, leading to the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a new one in their names. They argued the levy was illegal as the property no longer belonged to the judgment debtors and sought a preliminary injunction to stop Arellano’s possession.

ISSUE

Whether the Regional Trial Court correctly issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the Dilag children, restraining the enforcement of the writ of possession obtained by Arellano.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, which set aside the preliminary injunction. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of a preliminary injunction and the priority of rights under the Torrens system. A preliminary injunction requires a clear legal right, which the petitioners failed to establish. The levy on execution in 1979 and the subsequent auction sale in 1981 were validly conducted against the property still registered in the names of the judgment debtors, the Dilag spouses. The petitioners’ adverse claim, based on the 1973 unregistered deed of sale, did not defeat the levy because the registered owners remained the spouses. The issuance of a new title to the petitioners in 1981, after the auction sale, was an attempt to circumvent the execution process. Critically, the Court found that the petitioners were not in actual possession of the property at the time they sought the injunction; possession had already been delivered to Arellano. Since a writ of possession issued after a confirmation of an execution sale is ministerial, the trial court had no discretion to restrain its enforcement via injunction. The petitioners’ remedy, if any, was a separate action to assert their ownership, not an injunction against a consummated execution.