GR 94878 94881; (May, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 94878-94881; May 15, 1991
NORBERTO A. ROMUALDEZ III, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Norberto A. Romualdez III, previously a permanent Commercial Attaché, was transferred to the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) on September 1, 1987. The PCA extended to him a temporary appointment as Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development, effective for a fixed term from September 1, 1987, to August 30, 1988. This temporary appointment was renewed for another six months, from September 1, 1988, to February 28, 1989. Upon the expiration of his term on February 28, 1989, the PCA Governing Board opted not to renew his appointment, and he was duly informed of this decision.
Subsequently, on February 6, 1990, Romualdez appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), requesting reinstatement and the issuance of a permanent appointment. He invoked CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, series of 1989, which mandates the issuance of permanent appointments to those meeting all position requirements. The CSC denied his request through Resolution No. 90-407, dated May 2, 1990, ruling that the circular, which took effect on July 19, 1989, could not be applied retroactively to his case, as his separation occurred months earlier. The CSC also emphasized that reappointment is discretionary on the part of the appointing authority. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE
Whether the Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Romualdez’s request for reinstatement and a permanent appointment, and whether the appointing authority (PCA) can be compelled to issue such an appointment.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in Romualdez’s claims. The Court held that the appointment extended by the PCA was explicitly temporary and for a definite period. By accepting a temporary appointment, Romualdez effectively divested himself of security of tenure; his tenure was dependent on the pleasure of the appointing power and expired by its own terms. Consequently, the non-renewal of his temporary appointment was not a removal from office requiring due process, but a simple expiration of term.
The Court further ruled that the CSC correctly refused to apply Memorandum Circular No. 29 retroactively, as Romualdez was already out of service when the circular took effect. Even assuming its applicability, the circular itself recognizes the appointing authority’s wide discretion in personnel selection. The PCA exercised this discretion by choosing not to renew his appointment. The CSC’s power is limited to approving or disapproving appointments based on the appointee’s qualifications; it cannot compel an appointing authority to issue a specific appointment, especially a permanent one, as this constitutes a discretionary act not subject to mandamus. Romualdez failed to establish a clear legal right to the contested position.
