GR 108538; (January, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 108538 ; January 22, 1996
LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION and ROSITA DIMALANTA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo Valmonte, spouses residing in Washington, U.S.A., were sued for partition and accounting by respondent Rosita Dimalanta, Lourdes’s sister, before the RTC of Manila. Alfredo, a member of the Philippine Bar, maintains a law office in Manila. In a prior letter dated July 4, 1991, Lourdes instructed Dimalanta’s counsel to address “all communications” regarding the property dispute to her husband, Atty. Alfredo Valmonte, at his Manila office address. When the suit was filed, summons was served at Alfredo’s Manila office. He accepted summons for himself but refused the copy for Lourdes, arguing he lacked authority to accept process on her behalf. Consequently, Lourdes did not file an Answer, prompting Dimalanta to move to declare her in default. The RTC denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, declaring Lourdes in default on the grounds that her letter authorized her husband to receive all communications, including summons, and it would be inequitable to allow her to deny such authority.
ISSUE
Whether there was valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, a foreign resident, through service upon her husband and co-defendant, Atty. Alfredo Valmonte, at his law office in Manila.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC orders, holding that no valid service of summons was effected upon Lourdes. The Court clarified that service of summons is a formal and strict legal process, not a mere communication. Lourdes’s letter, written seven months before the litigation and in the context of pre-suit negotiations, merely authorized her husband to receive correspondence pertaining to those negotiations. This directive could not be construed as a grant of authority to receive summons in a subsequent judicial action. Authority for an attorney to receive summons must be expressly conferred or clearly demonstrable; it cannot be inferred from a general instruction to receive “all communications” in a non-judicial setting. Furthermore, Alfredo’s subsequent special appearance to oppose the motion for default did not constitute a voluntary appearance that would cure defective service, as it was precisely to challenge the court’s jurisdiction over Lourdes due to invalid service. Therefore, the attempted substituted service was invalid, and the trial court correctly refused to declare Lourdes in default.
