G.R. No. 81239 , December 4, 1991
NELSON L. YOUNG and VIOLETA YOUNG, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC), as assignee, filed a complaint against petitioners Nelson and Violeta Young for the payment of a promissory note related to an installment purchase of a cargo truck. The case underwent multiple procedural delays and transfers between courts. Notably, on September 2, 1983, the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order dismissing IFC’s complaint for failure of IFC and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial conference. The same order allowed petitioners to present evidence ex-parte on their third-party complaint. IFC received a copy of this dismissal order on September 20, 1983.
IFC took no action to revive its complaint for over a year. On May 25, 1984, the Makati RTC issued another order dismissing the case for lack of interest to prosecute. This order was later modified to clarify it was directed at the petitioners for their failure to present ex-parte evidence. Subsequently, on September 27, 1984, IFC finally filed a motion to reconsider the September 2, 1983 dismissal order. The Makati RTC granted this motion, set aside the dismissal, considered the case submitted for decision based solely on IFC’s previously presented evidence, and rendered a decision in favor of IFC. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Makati RTC’s decision, which set aside the order of dismissal and decided the case based on IFC’s evidence, despite IFC’s prolonged inaction.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error. The Supreme Court reinstated the Makati RTC’s Order of September 2, 1983, which had dismissed IFC’s complaint. The legal logic is grounded on the principle of finality of orders and the rule against unreasonable delay. An order dismissing a complaint for failure to prosecute at a pre-trial conference becomes final if not appealed or set aside within the reglementary period. IFC received the dismissal order on September 20, 1983, yet waited over a year until September 27, 1984, to file a motion for reconsideration. This constitutes an inexcusable and inordinate delay, amounting to sleeping on one’s rights. The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights (vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt). Consequently, the September 2, 1983 order had long become final and executory. The Makati RTC’s subsequent orders setting aside the final dismissal and rendering a decision were therefore null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. The case was correctly dismissed for IFC’s failure to prosecute.