GR 99357; (January, 1992) (Digest)
G.R. No. 99357. January 27, 1992.
MA. LOURDES VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLUE CROSS INSURANCE, INC., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Ma. Lourdes Villanueva held a sickness and accident insurance policy from private respondent Blue Cross Insurance, Inc. She was hospitalized and operated on for cholecystitis, incurring expenses of P48,934.05. Blue Cross denied her claim, asserting that cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition excluded under the policy. The Insurance Commission ruled in favor of Villanueva, ordering Blue Cross to pay the claim.
Blue Cross received the Insurance Commission’s decision on September 27, 1990. It filed a motion for reconsideration on October 15, 1990, which was beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The Commission denied this motion on December 13, 1990. Blue Cross then filed a notice of appeal with the Insurance Commission on December 17, 1990. However, it failed to file a copy of this notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals as required by law.
ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error in reinstating Blue Cross’s appeal despite the latter’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the appellate court as mandated by Republic Act No. 5434?
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and annulled the Court of Appeals’ resolution reinstating the appeal. The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is both mandatory and jurisdictional. At the time, appeals from quasi-judicial bodies like the Insurance Commission to the Court of Appeals were governed by Republic Act No. 5434, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The law explicitly required the appellant to file a notice of appeal both with the Court of Appeals and with the quasi-judicial body within the prescribed period. In this case, while Blue Cross may have filed a notice with the Insurance Commission, its undisputed failure to file any notice with the Court of Appeals was fatal to its appeal. This omission rendered the decision of the Insurance Commission final and executory. The Court of Appeals therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain, much less reinstate, the appeal. The appellate court’s invocation of “substantial justice” to excuse this procedural lapse was erroneous, as no compelling reason was shown to warrant a suspension of the mandatory rules. Strict compliance is indispensable for the orderly dispatch of judicial business.
