GR 137354; (July, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 137354 ; July 6, 2000
SALVADOR M. DE VERA, petitioner, vs. HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City; and EVALUATION AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Salvador M. De Vera, a non-lawyer representing himself, filed a special civil action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig to enjoin an ejectment case against him. The case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, who denied De Vera’s application for a temporary restraining order and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Dissatisfied, De Vera filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, accusing Judge Pelayo of violating Articles 206 and 207 of the Revised Penal Code (on rendering unjust interlocutory orders and malicious delay) and Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Ombudsman, through an Evaluation Report dated October 2, 1998, recommended referring the complaint to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, citing the ruling in Maceda vs. Vasquez. The Ombudsman considered the case closed and terminated from its end and formally referred it to the Court Administrator. De Vera’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file the present petition for certiorari and mandamus to assail the Ombudsman’s actions.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in referring the criminal complaint against Judge Pelayo to the Supreme Court instead of investigating it.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. The Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s Evaluation Report and Memorandum. The legal logic is anchored on the principle of judicial independence and the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court over the conduct of judges. The Court, citing In Re: Joaquin Borromeo, established that before any civil or criminal action can be entertained against a judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order under Articles 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, there must first be a final and authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is indeed unjust. This declaration can only come from a higher court via an action like certiorari or prohibition, or from an administrative proceeding within the Supreme Court itself.
The determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed a case is likewise an exclusive judicial function. No other government entity, including the Ombudsman, has the competence to review a judicial order or decision and pronounce it erroneous as a basis for a criminal complaint. Therefore, the Ombudsman acted correctly and in accordance with settled jurisprudence by referring the complaint to the Supreme Court, which has the constitutional mandate to supervise judges and administer the judiciary. The Ombudsman’s referral was a proper recognition of this jurisdictional boundary and did not constitute an evasion of duty or arbitrary action.
