GR 117589; (May, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 117589-92 May 22, 1996
Romeo R. Salalima, et al. vs. Hon. Teofisto T. Guingona, et al.
FACTS
Petitioners, elective officials of the Province of Albay, were administratively charged in several complaints filed with the Office of the President. An Ad Hoc Committee investigated and found them liable for various acts, including wanton disregard of law and abuse of authority. Based on the Committee’s report, President Fidel V. Ramos, through Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, issued Administrative Order No. 153 dated October 7, 1994, imposing successive suspension periods on each petitioner, the total duration of which would exceed their unexpired terms ending June 30, 1995. The charges stemmed primarily from the petitioners’ failure to remit to the Municipality of Tiwi its statutory share of real property tax payments made by the National Power Corporation (NPC) to the province, despite a prior Supreme Court ruling and a Memorandum of Agreement.
ISSUE
Whether the President, through the Executive Secretary, committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing successive suspension penalties that effectively removed the petitioners from office.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court annulled Administrative Order No. 153, ruling that the imposition of successive suspension terms resulting in removal from office constituted grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that the power to suspend an elective local official, as a penalty, must not be exercised in a manner that usurps the power to remove. Under Section 66 of the Local Government Code, suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or six months for every administrative offense. While the law allows successive service of penalties for multiple offenses, such implementation must not circumvent the constitutional and statutory protections of elective officials. The Court held that imposing suspensions to be served one after the other, where the aggregate period extends beyond the official’s term, is a manipulation of the law that effectively amounts to a removal from office—a power not vested in the disciplining authority under the circumstances. This arbitrary exercise of power violates the security of tenure of elected officials and negates the sovereign will of the electorate. The Court emphasized that disciplinary power must be exercised with utmost good faith and not through caprice. Consequently, the order was declared void for grave abuse of discretion.