GR 127899; (December, 1999) (Digest)
G.R. No. 127899 December 2, 1999
MARILYN C. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON T. CASTRO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Marilyn C. Santos was convicted of 54 counts of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and sentenced to a total of 54 years imprisonment, plus payment of P3,989,175.10 to private respondent Corazon T. Castro. Santos filed an application for probation. During the pendency of her application, the trial court granted Castro’s motion for a writ of execution for the civil liability. The sheriff levied on a Benguet property of Santos. Subsequently, Santos and her husband executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same property to Teodoro Dijamco. The sheriff later annotated the notice of levy on the property’s title. Castro opposed the probation application, arguing Santos was ineligible due to the lengthy sentence and was disposing of assets to evade her civil liability.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly nullified the trial court’s order granting probation to petitioner.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision setting aside the grant of probation. The legal logic is anchored on the probation law’s requirement that an offender must not be an “incorrigible” one. Probation is an act of grace and privilege, not a right, for qualified offenders who are likely to reform.
The Court found that Santos’s conduct after conviction demonstrated she was not a proper candidate for probation. By selling the levied property after the judgment and notice of levy, she engaged in a scheme to defraud her creditor and obstruct the execution of the judgment. This act showed a lack of remorse and a propensity to disobey lawful orders. Such behavior is contrary to the rehabilitative purpose of probation. It proved she was incorrigible and a menace to society, thus disqualifying her from probationary grace. The improper grant of probation, being void for grave abuse of discretion, could be annulled at any time, even if the probation period had commenced.