G.R. No. L-27043 November 28, 1975
AGUSTIN SANCHEZ and VICTORINA MUTIA DE SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE MARIANO A. ZOSA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental; PORFIRIA C. YU and LIBORIO YU, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, the Sanchez spouses, were defendants in an ejectment case before the municipal court, which ordered them to vacate a lot, remove their house, and pay a monthly rental of five pesos and damages. They appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). To stay execution, they perfected their appeal, paid the docket fee and appeal bond, and deposited P150 with the court. This deposit was intended to cover the adjudged damages and advance monthly rentals for ten months, from May 1966 to February 1967. The private respondents, the Yu spouses, moved for execution, alleging the petitioners failed to pay or deposit the current monthly rentals for May to September 1966. The CFI granted the motion, ordering execution. It held that the supersedeas bond only covered rentals in arrears up to the decision and that current rentals must be separately paid or deposited under Rule 70. Execution was carried out by the sheriff. The CFI later required the petitioners to show cause why they should not be held in contempt.

ISSUE

Whether the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of the municipal court’s judgment and in citing the petitioners for contempt, based on the petitioners’ alleged failure to deposit current monthly rentals during the appeal.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the CFI gravely abused its discretion. Under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to stay execution in an ejectment appeal, a defendant must perfect an appeal, file a supersedeas bond to answer for rents and damages accruing up to the judgment, and during the appeal’s pendency, deposit the current rentals from time to time. Here, the petitioners’ cash deposit of P150 constituted a sufficient supersedeas bond. It covered the damages and advance rentals for a specified future period (up to February 1967). Therefore, they had no further obligation to make separate monthly deposits or payments for that covered period. The execution ordered in September 1966 was premature. The CFI’s erroneous interpretation of the rule amounted to a capricious and whimsical exercise of power equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, correctible by certiorari. The orders for execution and contempt were set aside. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with instruction for the CFI to also resolve the intertwined issue of title to avoid multiplicity of suits.