G.R. No. L-34223 December 10, 1982
Honorio Lopez and Catalina Zabala, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Philippine National Bank and the Provincial Sheriff of Leyte, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

The Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a money claim against Jorge Delgado, Guillermo Varona, and spouses Honorio Lopez and Catalina Zabala in the Municipal Court of Tacloban City (Civil Case No. 125). A 1952 decision was rendered against all defendants. The spouses Lopez and Zabala successfully moved to set aside this decision, arguing they were not properly summoned. The municipal court, in an order dated November 1, 1952, granted their motion, set aside the decision as to them, and explicitly ordered that they “be summoned according to ordinary proceedings.”
Despite this clear order for new summons, PNB moved to set the case for hearing in 1954, claiming the spouses had voluntarily appeared through their counsel, Atty. Julio Siayngco, by filing the earlier motion to set aside. Over the next two years, Atty. Siayngco secured several postponements, with notations on court notices indicating the defendants had not been summoned and were residing in Manila. The case eventually proceeded to a second hearing in December 1956 in the spouses’ absence, resulting in a new decision against them.

ISSUE

Whether the Municipal Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of spouses Lopez and Zabala for the second hearing and decision, given the court’s prior order for them to be summoned anew.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of First Instance’s declaration that the second municipal court decision was null and void. The legal logic is grounded in fundamental jurisdictional requirements. The municipal court’s November 1, 1952 order setting aside the initial judgment against the spouses and directing that they “be summoned according to ordinary proceedings” had the effect of placing the case back to its pre-trial stage as to them. This order was mandatory.
Consequently, for the court to validly proceed against the spouses and bind them by a new judgment, it was imperative that the directive for proper summons be complied with. The record conclusively showed this was never done. The manifestations and motions for postponement filed by their counsel, which noted the lack of summons and their residence in Manila, were not a voluntary appearance conferring jurisdiction. They were, in fact, objections to the court’s lack of jurisdiction over their persons due to the absence of the ordered summons. Since jurisdiction over the defendants was never acquired through proper service, the subsequent proceedings and the decision rendered against them were null and void.