G.R. No. L-56133 September 30, 1981
ANTONIO ESTABAYA, petitioner, vs. HON. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, City Judge of Manila, Branch VII and ROSITA L. GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Antonio Estabaya was the defendant in an ejectment case before the City Court of Manila. During a hearing scheduled for July 29, 1980, for the continuation of the reception of his evidence, he requested a postponement. The ground was that his counsel was ill and confined in a hospital. As proof, he presented a Certificate of Confinement from the attending physician. The respondent Judge denied the postponement, ruling that the certificate was not under oath, and consequently considered the case submitted for decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to lift the order, explaining that the physician became available only on the evening before the hearing, leaving no time to have the certificate notarized. He attached a duly notarized certificate of confinement. The respondent Court denied this motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration, which included a notarized medical certificate, both for lack of merit. This prompted the filing of the present Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement and in considering the case submitted for decision despite a valid reason for the counsel’s absence.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court found that the sworn certificate of confinement, along with supporting hospital documents, sufficiently proved that petitioner’s counsel was indeed hospitalized on the date of the hearing, constituting a valid ground for requesting a deferment. The technical defect of the initial certificate being unsworn was adequately cured by the subsequent submission of a notarized certificate.
The legal logic centers on the proper exercise of judicial discretion in balancing the need for speedy disposition of cases with the paramount demand of justice. The Court emphasized that while previous postponements had been granted at the petitioner’s instance, this fact alone should not preclude a subsequent postponement when a legitimate and substantiated reason exists. The right to be heard, a fundamental component of due process, would be undermined if a litigant is deprived of representation due to counsel’s proven incapacity. Speed in judicial administration must yield to the cause of justice when no manifest intention to delay is present and no substantial rights are prejudiced. Postponements are inherent in the procedural system to ensure a fair reckoning between parties.
Accordingly, the assailed Orders were annulled and set aside. The respondent Court was ordered to continue the hearing of the ejectment case until its termination, with the caveat that no further petitions for postponement shall be entertained provided ample notice is given.