G.R. No. L-38068 September 30, 1981
ELISA O. GAMBOA, EDMUND FRITZ WEBER, a minor assisted by FAY G. WEBER, Guardian, and JUAN S. LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COROLLA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and BERT VILLALON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners were defendants in a damages case where judgment was rendered against them. After the judgment became final, a writ of execution was issued, leading to a public auction sale of a Toyota Corolla taxi and a Certificate of Public Convenience, which were awarded to the private respondents’ counsel, Atty. Jesus Suntay. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to set aside the sale, citing fraud, mistake, and irregularities. Presiding Judge Vivencio Ruiz initially denied this motion but later granted a motion for reconsideration on September 18, 1972, setting aside the sale due to alleged defects, including inadequate price and lack of proper authorization for the bidding counsel. Judge Ruiz tendered his resignation on October 4, 1972, and his order setting aside the sale was filed with the Clerk of Court on October 18, 1972. His successor, Judge Arsenio Alcantara, upon motion by private respondents, annulled Judge Ruiz’s September 18 order on January 26, 1973, declaring it null and void for being promulgated after Judge Ruiz had effectively ceased to be a member of the judiciary, thereby restoring the validity of the execution sale.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether Judge Ruiz’s order of September 18, 1972, setting aside the execution sale, was validly promulgated and issued by a judge with authority to do so, or whether it was correctly annulled by his successor for having been issued after his resignation had taken effect.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding Judge Alcantara’s order annulling Judge Ruiz’s September 18 order. The legal logic centers on the effective date of a judge’s resignation and its impact on judicial authority. A judge’s power to decide cases ceases upon the effective date of his resignation. Judge Ruiz tendered his resignation on October 4, 1972, in compliance with a Letter of Instruction. The Court ruled that the resignation became effective upon its filing or submission to the proper authority, and notice of acceptance by the President was not necessary for it to take effect. Consequently, Judge Ruiz was no longer a de jure judge after October 4, 1972. The order dated September 18, 1972, was only filed with the Clerk of Court on October 18, 1972. For a judgment or order to be valid, it must be promulgated during the incumbency of the signing judge. Since the order was filed and released after Judge Ruiz’s authority had terminated, it was issued without jurisdiction and was therefore void. The Court rejected petitioners’ arguments regarding the merits of setting aside the execution sale, as the foundational order itself was a nullity. The decision prioritizes the finality and stability of judicial proceedings, emphasizing that acts performed by a judge after losing authority are invalid, regardless of the date written on the order.