A.M. No. P-1487. December 20, 1977.
Maria H. Perol, complainant, vs. Arsenio Lupisan, Jr., respondent.

FACTS

Maria H. Perol, a restaurant cashier, filed a verified administrative complaint on December 27, 1976, against Arsenio R. Lupisan, Jr., an interpreter in the Municipal Court of Navotas, Rizal. She charged him with immorality, specifically alleging that he was responsible for her pregnancy. Lupisan, in his defense, categorically denied the accusation. He asserted that his relationship with Perol was merely platonic and suggested that she had targeted him as a scapegoat for her condition upon learning that he was the sole heir to his mother’s estate.
During the administrative hearing conducted on October 25, 1977, by the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, a significant procedural development occurred. Respondent Lupisan moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that he had ceased to be a court interpreter, as his official appointment had already expired on August 11, 1977, and he was not seeking reappointment. Confronted with this motion, the counsel representing complainant Perol formally manifested her withdrawal of the administrative charge. The Investigating Judge subsequently recommended that the case be considered closed.

ISSUE

Whether the administrative complaint for immorality against respondent Arsenio Lupisan, Jr., should proceed given the subsequent withdrawal of the complaint and the respondent’s separation from the judiciary.

RULING

The Court dismissed the complaint and ordered the case closed. The legal logic for dismissal rests on the confluence of two key factors that rendered further administrative proceedings moot and unjustified. First, the complainant, through her counsel, made a clear and voluntary manifestation of her desire to withdraw the charge. While the withdrawal of a complaint does not automatically result in dismissal, as administrative cases involve public interest and the integrity of the judicial service, it is a significant circumstance to be considered, especially when coupled with other dispositive factors.
Second, and decisively, the respondent had already ceased to be a member of the judiciary at the time of the hearing. His appointment as a court interpreter had expired, and he expressly stated he was not seeking reappointment. The Court’s administrative disciplinary power is anchored on its authority over its officials and employees to ensure the proper administration of justice. Once a respondent is no longer in the government service, the primary purpose of administrative discipline—to preserve the institution’s integrity and to correct or remove errant personnel—largely loses its applicability. Pursuing the case against a former employee who is beyond the Court’s supervisory authority serves no practical purpose. Therefore, with the charge withdrawn and the respondent separated from service, the Court found no compelling reason to continue the proceedings.