G.R. No. L-27714 November 5, 1981
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, petitioner-appellee, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

The Mayor of Manila, Antonio J. Villegas, sought to appoint 91 women as street sweepers. However, Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido, citing his own Memorandum Circular No. 18, s. 1964, directed the City Auditor to withhold the salaries of these women. The Circular prohibited the employment of women in laborer positions performing manual work outside office premises, deeming it a violation of the traditional dignity of Filipino womanhood. The Commissioner threatened to disapprove such appointments and informed the Auditor to prevent “illegal” disbursements.
Villegas filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing the Circular was invalid. The lower court discovered a critical fact: the Office of the President had already set aside and declared Memorandum Circular No. 18 without force and effect in a ruling dated September 14, 1965—over a year before the Commissioner’s directive to withhold salaries. Despite this presidential action, the Commissioner attempted to enforce the defunct policy.

ISSUE

Whether the Civil Service Commissioner could validly enforce Memorandum Circular No. 18 to disapprove the appointments of female street sweepers and order the withholding of their salaries.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling for Mayor Villegas. The legal logic is anchored on two primary grounds. First, the specific directive was based on an invalid rule. Memorandum Circular No. 18, the sole basis for the Commissioner’s action, had been nullified by the Office of the President. A public official cannot enforce a policy that has been officially revoked by a higher executive authority. The Commissioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, filed over a year later, did not revive the Circular’s force; it remained unenforceable unless and until the President reversed the disapproval.
Second, and more fundamentally, the ruling reinforces the principle that a public official must act within delegated authority. The Court, citing a prior case between the same parties (Villegas v. Subido), held that an official exercises power, not rights, and must point to a valid grant of such power, either express or implied. The Commissioner’s personal policy conviction, however sincere, regarding the dignity of women was not a substitute for legal authority. The Court noted that the practice of employing women as street sweepers (e.g., as Metro Aides) had become accepted and that trends in equal protection argued against such gender-based discrimination. Therefore, the Commissioner’s directive was issued without legal basis and was correctly enjoined by the lower court.