G.R. No. L-48113. June 6, 1990. CHARLES L. YANG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, BOARD OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, and BENJAMIN M. LIMSON, respondents.
FACTS

Petitioner Charles L. Yang, an electrical engineer, was administratively charged with unprofessional conduct by respondent Benjamin M. Limson before the Board of Electrical Engineering. The Board found him guilty and suspended him from practice for two years. Yang appealed to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), which affirmed the Board’s decision and ordered him to surrender his certificate of registration. After the PRC denied his motion for reconsideration, Yang filed a petition for review with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The trial court dismissed his petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, ruling that he should have first appealed the PRC decision to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 839. Yang then appealed to the Court of Appeals.
While his appeal was pending, Yang received an order from the Board’s Executive Director to surrender his certificate and cease practice. He filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court initially issued a temporary restraining order but later, by Resolution dated March 8, 1978, lifted it and denied the injunction. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s reasoning, citing Letter of Implementation No. 47, which transferred the function of deciding appeals on administrative cases involving professionals from the Office of the President to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. It ruled that Yang’s failure to appeal to the Civil Service Commission was a fatal omission.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Yang failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing the PRC decision to the Civil Service Commission.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is clear. The Court held that at the time of the issuance of Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 47 on August 18, 1976, the Office of the President no longer possessed the function of deciding appeals from PRC decisions. This function had been statutorily removed earlier. Presidential Decree No. 223, which created the PRC in 1973, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations provided that a decision of a professional board could be appealed to the PRC, and the PRC’s decision “shall be final… within thirty days from receipt thereof.” Furthermore, under the Integrated Reorganization Plan adopted by P.D. No. 1 , a regulatory agency like the PRC, with adjudicatory powers, had decisions that were not subject to review by a department head unless specifically provided by law. Appeals from such agencies were to be taken directly to the courts of justice.
Therefore, LOI No. 47 was founded on a mistaken assumption that the appealed function still resided with the Office of the President. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission never validly acquired appellate jurisdiction over PRC decisions. The PRC’s decision was final, and Yang’s proper recourse was judicial review. The Court noted that the law on the specific court for appeal had since changed with Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, granting the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies like the PRC. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and resolve Yang’s appeal on its merits.