G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Quezon City enacted Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, which regulated private memorial parks. Its Section 9 mandated that at least six percent of a cemetery’s total area be set aside for the charity burial of city residents who are paupers. For years, this provision was not enforced. In 1971, the City Council passed a resolution directing the City Engineer to halt lot sales in memorial parks whose owners failed to donate the required 6% paupers’ area. Pursuant to this, the City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. of the ordinance’s enforcement.
Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and mandamus with the Court of First Instance, seeking to annul Section 9 as unconstitutional and ultra vires, alleging it constituted a taking of private property without just compensation. The parties submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings. The lower court declared Section 9 null and void, prompting the City to elevate the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review.

ISSUE

Whether Section 9 of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, which requires private cemeteries to set aside 6% of their area for pauper burials, constitutes a valid exercise of police power or an invalid taking of private property without just compensation.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling Section 9 invalid. The legal logic centers on distinguishing between valid police power regulation and an unconstitutional taking. The Court held that the ordinance was not a valid police power measure. Police power allows for regulation to promote public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, but such regulation must have a reasonable relation to those objectives. Here, no such reasonable relation existed between compelling a private cemetery to cede a portion of its land for paupers and the promotion of public health, safety, or welfare.
The Court emphasized that the ordinance effected a confiscation of private property for public use without compensation. The city’s charter power to regulate cemeteries and provide for pauper burials does not include the power to compel private entities to donate property. Regulation does not encompass prohibition or confiscation. The city’s duty to provide burial grounds for paupers should be fulfilled by using public property or by acquiring private land through expropriation upon payment of just compensation, not by imposing the burden on private cemetery operators. The ordinance was also distinguished from valid subdivision regulations requiring land donations for public facilities, as those are directly tied to community planning and safety, and the cost is ultimately borne by lot buyers. Consequently, Section 9 was declared a taking beyond the scope of police power and without statutory or constitutional basis.