G.R. No. L-41742 August 23, 1978
MERCEDES OLLERO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CENTRAL LUZON MISSION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents.

FACTS

Mercedes Ollero was employed as a teacher by the Central Luzon Mission of Seventh Day Adventists (SDA Mission). For the school year 1973-1974, she was assigned to the SDA Elementary School in Galas, Quezon City, with the school subsidizing 75% of her transportation expenses from her residence in Caloocan City. On December 11, 1973, after her afternoon classes, Ollero alighted from a passenger jeep at a junction in Quezon City to transfer to another vehicle bound for her home. While alighting, she was struck by a speeding car, resulting in a fracture of her right femur and tibia. This injury rendered her unable to work from December 12, 1973, to October 24, 1974, and caused a permanent partial loss of the use of her right leg.
Ollero filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Hearing Officer issued an outright award in her favor. The SDA Mission filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the accident was not compensable as it occurred off-premises while Ollero was on her way home. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) set aside the award, applying the “going to and coming from” rule. It held that the accident happened on a public highway far from her place of employment, exposing her to hazards common to the public and not traceable to her employment.

ISSUE

Whether the injury sustained by Mercedes Ollero, which occurred while she was on her way home from work, is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the WCC decision and reinstated the award. The legal logic proceeds on two primary grounds. First, the Court clarified the application of the “going to and coming from” rule. While the general rule excludes injuries sustained during an ordinary commute, exceptions exist. The Court found Ollero’s situation fell within an exception because her employer provided a transportation allowance, subsidizing 75% of her fare. This financial support established a connection between her commute and her employment, making the hazards of the journey a risk incidental to her work.
Second, and decisively, the Court ruled that the employer had forfeited its right to contest the claim’s compensability due to procedural default. Under Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employer must file a notice of controversion within the prescribed period (14 days from disability or 10 days after knowledge of the injury). The SDA Mission failed to do so. Its Employer’s Report, filed almost eight months post-accident, left blank the item asking if it controverted the right to compensation. This failure constituted a renunciation of its right to deny liability and a statutory admission of compensability. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was filed too late and without the requisite sworn allegations to justify reinstatement of the right to controvert. Therefore, regardless of the substantive merits of the “off-premises” argument, the employer’s procedural lapse legally bound it to the award.