GR L 63677; (August, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-63677 August 12, 1983
LEO M. FLORES, MODESTO L. LICAROS and MARIO LOPEZ VITO, petitioners, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondents.
FACTS
On June 5, 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was robbed of over P19 million. Following a police raid, a portion of the money was recovered. The Tanodbayan filed an information with the Sandiganbayan charging several individuals, including petitioners Leo Flores, Modesto Licaros, and Mario Lopez Vito as principals, and private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros initially as an accessory. An amended information later charged all, including Abelardo, as principals. After arraignment, the Tanodbayan moved to discharge Abelardo to be utilized as a state witness, asserting compliance with the requisites under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Leo Flores opposed the motion, contending that the prosecution’s assertions were unsubstantiated and self-serving. He argued that Abelardo appeared to be the most guilty, acting as the mastermind, and that his testimony was not absolutely necessary. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for discharge on February 11, 1983, and denied a motion for reconsideration on March 21, 1983, prompting this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the discharge of accused Abelardo B. Licaros to be a state witness.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions. The discharge of an accused to become a state witness is governed by Section 9, Rule 119, which requires the trial court to ensure the existence of specific requisites, most critically the “absolute necessity” for the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged. This requisite is intended to prevent miscarriages of justice and curtail abuse of the power to discharge. The necessity must be such that the accused alone has knowledge of the crime, not merely that his testimony would corroborate or strengthen existing prosecution evidence.
The Court found that the Sandiganbayan prematurely granted the discharge. Petitioners correctly pointed out that other evidence, such as affidavits from security guards, already implicated co-accused Modesto Licaros, suggesting Abelardo’s testimony might only be corroborative. Given the petitioners’ opposition, specifically challenging the claim of absolute necessity and asserting Abelardo was the most guilty, the prudent course was for the trial court to defer its resolution. It should have first allowed the prosecution to present its other evidence to properly determine if all legal requisites, especially absolute necessity and that the accused is not the most guilty, were truly satisfied. This procedural safeguard is vital to prevent injustice, as an early discharge risks the discharged witness disappearing, defeating the purpose of the discharge. The orders were annulled, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.