G.R. No. L-68056 July 5, 1985
BREN Z. GUIAO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ABER P. CANLAS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PAMPANGA and MANUEL LUCERO, respondents.

FACTS

The case stemmed from the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections in Pampanga. The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of all election returns by May 16, 1984, without any objections raised during the process. After the tally showed petitioner Bren Z. Guiao in fifth place and private respondent Aber P. Canlas in fourth, Guiao submitted written objections to returns from 31 voting centers only after the canvass was completed, at around 12:50 A.M. on May 17. The Board heard his objections later that day but dismissed them for failure to substantiate and denied his request to subpoena election committee members, deeming the hearing summary. The Board then proclaimed the winning candidates, including Canlas, at 6:00 P.M. on May 17, 1984.
Guiao filed petitions with the COMELEC seeking to annul the proclamation, arguing it was premature and violated his right to due process, specifically citing Section 54 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697. The COMELEC First Division dismissed his suit, prompting an appeal to the COMELEC en banc. Guiao invoked the Supreme Court’s ruling in Javier vs. COMELEC, which held that a proclamation made before the expiration of the five-day period for appeal is void. The COMELEC en banc, however, denied his motion to declare Canlas’s proclamation null and void.

ISSUE

Whether the proclamation of respondent Aber P. Canlas by the Provincial Board of Canvassers was null and void for being prematurely made in violation of Section 54 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared the proclamation of Aber P. Canlas null and void. The legal logic centers on the mandatory nature of Section 54 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which governed the canvass of votes for the Batasan Pambansa. This provision explicitly stated that a candidate adversely affected by a ruling of the board regarding the inclusion or exclusion of election returns may appeal to the COMELEC within five days. Crucially, it mandated that “the board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate without the approval of the Commission if there is an appeal pending” within the five-day period. The Court, applying the precedent set in Javier vs. COMELEC, held that this five-day period is a mandatory waiting period designed to prevent “grab-the-proclamation” tactics. Any proclamation made before the expiration of this period is premature and void. In this case, Guiao filed his objections with the board, which constituted an adverse ruling, and the board proclaimed Canlas on the same day, well within the five-day window for appeal. Therefore, the proclamation was made in clear violation of the statutory prohibition. The COMELEC’s argument that Guiao’s objections were belated and unsubstantiated was irrelevant to the procedural violation; the prematurity of the proclamation rendered it invalid ab initio. The proper remedy was to annul the proclamation and direct the board to reconvene, complete the canvass lawfully, and proclaim only after the legal periods had lapsed.