AM 1500; (December, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-39900 December 14, 1978
JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. AMADO S. CENIZA, respondent.
FACTS
This disbarment proceeding originated from the acrimonious fallout between Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian and Atty. Amado S. Ceniza, stemming from Civil Case No. 614 before Judge Sebastian’s court. The judge, personally acquainted with the litigants, issued an ex parte writ of mandatory injunction and summoned the defendant, Ceniza’s client, to his residence for a settlement. Ceniza, believing these actions irregular, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Sebastian with the Supreme Court on December 7, 1974, which was later dismissed. In retaliation, Judge Sebastian initiated this disbarment case against Ceniza on December 9, 1974, alleging grave misconduct, gross immorality, and reprehensible conduct.
Ceniza moved to dismiss, arguing lack of jurisdiction and the judge’s personal bias, but his motion was denied. He then filed a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed. Ceniza did not answer the disbarment complaint or appear at the ex parte hearing conducted by Judge Sebastian, who subsequently rendered a decision on June 22, 1975, finding Ceniza guilty and suspending him from law practice. The case record was elevated to the Supreme Court, which required Ceniza’s answer. His belated answer was filed in 1978.
ISSUE
Whether the charges of grave misconduct, gross immorality, and reprehensible conduct against Atty. Amado S. Ceniza warrant his disbarment or continued suspension from the practice of law.
RULING
The Supreme Court lifted the suspension and dismissed the case. The Court’s ruling was grounded on the contextual and evidentiary deficiencies of the charges. The allegation of grave misconduct was intrinsically linked to Ceniza’s defense of his client in Civil Case No. 614, where he alleged judicial pressure in a compromise settlement—an act for which Judge Sebastian had already held him in contempt. The Court found this charge inseparable from the judge’s personal involvement in that case, which had sparked their mutual hostility.
Regarding gross immorality and reprehensible conduct, the charges were based on various dismissed criminal cases for rape, seduction, and other offenses. The Court emphasized that none of these cases resulted in a final conviction; they were either dismissed due to the desistance of complainants or lack of prosecution. Consequently, the presumption of innocence in favor of Ceniza remained intact. The Court noted that the offended parties themselves did not pursue disbarment, except for one aborted case. Given the retaliatory origin of the complaint, the judge’s personal interest, and the absence of conclusive proof of moral turpitude, the Supreme Court deemed further investigation unnecessary and ordered the lifting of Ceniza’s suspension.
