G.R. No. L-52733. July 23, 1985.
PILAR DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO GESTUVO, and MINERVA GESTUVO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. JUDGE PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, and LEONIDA P. SINGH, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners (sellers) and private respondent Leonida P. Singh (buyer) executed a Contract to Sell in 1971. A dispute arose when the sellers refused the buyer’s pre-payment request for certain documents. The buyer filed a complaint for specific performance. The parties later submitted a Compromise Agreement, approved by the trial court in a November 29, 1977 decision. The agreement stipulated that the buyer would pay P250,000.00 on or before January 27, 1978, at 10:00 a.m., in the courtroom of Judge Bautista. Failure to pay would deem the contract rescinded, entitling the sellers to a writ of execution for possession.
The buyer did not make the full payment in court on January 27, 1978. Instead, a partial payment of P220,000.00 had been deposited with the clerk of court days earlier, and an attempt to tender the remaining P30,000.00 to the sellers’ counsel on the deadline was refused. The buyer completed the deposit to P250,000.00 only on January 30, 1978. The sellers moved for a writ of execution based on the buyer’s failure to pay on the stipulated date and place.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ motion for execution and in dismissing their appeal for failure to comply with the material data rule.

RULING

No, the Court of Appeals did not err. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. On the substantive issue, the Court ruled that the private respondent substantially complied with the compromise agreement. The essence of the agreement was payment of the purchase price, which was fully satisfied when the total amount of P250,000.00 was deposited with the Clerk of Court, an officer of the court, by January 30, 1978. The sellers’ refusal to accept the tender of the balance on the deadline, and their subsequent motion for execution, constituted a waiver of strict compliance with the literal terms regarding the place of payment. The trial court correctly prioritized substance over form to prevent injustice.
Regarding the procedural issue, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals. The petitioners failed to perfect their appeal on time. Their record on appeal, filed on August 26, 1978, did not show on its face that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, as it omitted the date of receipt of the July 24, 1978 order denying their motion for reconsideration. This violation of the material data rule is mandatory and jurisdictional. While the rule has been relaxed in certain cases, such liberality applies only where the record on appeal facially shows timely filing. Here, the omission was fatal, and the appellate court correctly denied due course to the appeal. The trial court’s orders had thus become final and executory.